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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, Ryan T. Davidson, Defendant-Appellant in the above-entitled action, 
representing himself, with this reply brief in support of his appeal. 
A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a "Driving Without Privileges" case. (Idaho Code § 18-8001). Davidson pled 
guilty to DWP while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge 
on constitutional grounds. 
B. REPLY TO THE RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS 
An accurate recital of the timeline of prior proceedings is contained in the Appellant's 
brief, pp. 1 - 2. The "Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings" contained in the 
Respondent's brief, p. 1, (excerpted verbatim from the District Court's "MEMORANDUM 
DECISION ON APPEAL") contains certain errors in the second paragraph. 
To clarify: Davidson was originally assigned counsel from the Public Defender's Office. 
This attorney refused to file a motion to dismiss and then pressured Davidson to plead guilty, 
based on legally incorrect advice. Davidson later filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, 
which was granted by the court. The court then tried to reassign the same deficient counsel to 
Davidson, who objected. It was at this point the court ordered conflict counsel to represent 
Davidson, who also refused to file a motion to dismiss. On October 28, 2008, Davidson failed to 
attend a pretrial conference and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. After the pretrial 
conference, in discussion with Davidson's attorney, the Prosecutor offered to reduce the charge 
from a DWP to an Invalid License and agreed to stipulate to quash the bench warrant and not file 
additional charges for the failure to appear, if Davidson agreed to a $150 fine, and court costs of 
$75.50. Davidson did not respond to his counsel's letter offering the deal. Later, without 
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Davidson's consent, his attorney filed a proposed plea bargain on his behalf with the court. At 
the sentence hearing, Davidson refused to accept the plea. Nonetheless, it appeared that the 
bench warrant had been dismissed as a result of Davidson's appearance. Davidson once again 
asked his attorney to file a motion to dismiss. He again refused. Presented with no other option, 
Davidson signed a document so that he could proceed pro se and file a motion to dismiss by 
himself, even though it was never his desire to proceed without counsel. During this "hearing," 
the magistrate judge did not appear on the bench or question Davidson as to his actual desire to 
proceed prose. Davidson's attorney told him that the judge would not talk to him and that he 
needed to sign a document stating he wanted to proceed prose. Davidson later filed his motion 
to dismiss, the denial of such by the magistrate and district court judge is what triggered the 
appeal before the Supreme Court. 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case did not have a trial, as the Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty so that 
he could appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss his charge on constitutional grounds. There 
do not seem to be any contested issues of fact in this appeal. The appeal deals with the 
interpretation of certain statutes and rules, as well as constitutional challenges to various 
processes used by the state. Over questions of law and constitutional interpretations, the 
Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 
(1990). 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1) Davidson reaffirms and restates the six issues on appeal that were presented in his 
Appellant's brief, p. 3. 
2) In their Respondent's brief, p. 3, the State rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
a). Has Davidson failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate's order denying his motion to dismiss? 
b ). Has Davidson failed to establish that he is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees on appeal? 
3) In addition, Davidson raises the following new issues on appeal: 
a). That a majority of the State of Idaho's brief does not conform to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35 (b). 
b ). Davidson also expands upon his forth issue on appeal relating to the denial 
of counsel. It can be shown that Davidson's Sixth Amendment rights 
were also violated by the court when it did not inquire on the record 
whether or not Davidson's right to counsel was knowingly and 
intelligently waived. 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH I.A.R. 35 
Preliminarily, Davidson must object to a large portion of the State's reply brief. The 
State does not offer argument or analysis of its own relating to five out of six of Davidson's 
issues on appeal. Instead, the State simply incorporates the District Court's memorandum as its 
argument on appeal. Brief of Respondent, p. 5, lj[ C. This does not appear to be a practice 
consistent with the rules. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 (b) (6) states: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts 
of the transcript and record relied upon. 
This rule seems to contemplate that the Respondent should be drafting their own 
arguments, not simply cross-referencing court decisions. The State's brief does not contain their 
contentions and the reasons therefore, nor does it cite authorities, statutes, or parts of the 
transcript. At a minimum, the citations in the District Court's memorandum should have been 
incorporated into the briefs table of authorities. 
If an Appellant fails to include argument with respect to any issue on appeal, that issue is 
considered waived by the Supreme Court. Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887, 
892-93 (1996); Haight v Dale's Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853, 87 P.3d 962, n.1 (2003): 
"Because Haight has provided insufficient argument and no authority to support his contentions, 
the rule will not be relaxed and these issues will not be considered on appeal." Of course, in an 
appeal the burden of proof rests with the Appellant, and a Respondent's failure to argue an issue 
in its brief does not mandate a reversal of the District Court's decision under the theory of a 
waiver. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000). 
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Nonetheless, there is still the rule, and while the Court in Idaho Power, id., did not find that a 
violation of the rule on the part of the Respondent warranted a reversal, it did not close the door 
on any possible sanction. In Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., I 39 
Idaho 691, 85 P. 3d 667, 674 (2004), the Court found an attorney's compliance with I.AR. 35 (a) 
so deficient that it triggered sanctions under I.A.R. 11.1. The Court sanctioned the attorney by 
requiring him to pay attorney fees and costs jointly and severally with his client. 
In the immediate appeal, the Court should determine and state on the record whether the 
Respondent has complied with I.A.R. 35, even if such determination has no bearing on the 
eventual outcome of the Appellant's case. While the Respondent has no burden of proof to meet 
in their arguments, the rule is nonetheless mandatory and imposes a duty: "The argument shall 
contain the contentions of the respondent. .. " The adversarial system works best when both sides 
actually compete. At a minimum, failure to comply with Rule 35 should be considered a 
dereliction of duty to the Supreme Court. A properly researched brief aids the development of 
arguments and assists the Court in their decision-making process. If a violation of the rule is 
found, the articulation of such in the Court's eventual decision could in itself constitute a mild 
form of sanction. By simply documenting the infraction, the State Bar may decide to investigate, 
as may the attorney's employer. Finally, the public has a right to know about the quality of the 
legal work being done in their name, and subsidized by their tax dollars. 
2. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S REBUTTAL TO 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S MEMORANDUM 
As the State has incorporated the District Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL 
(R. Vol.I, pp.139-151) as their argument, the Appellant will endeavor to specifically address the 
arguments contained therein. The lynchpin of the District Court's opinion can be boiled down as 
follows: After Davidson's license was suspended, he failed to appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 
49-1505 (6). As such, he is barred from using as a defense to the charge of DWP the argument 
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that the license suspension was illegal or unconstitutional. Memorandum, p. 7, CJ[ 2-3. 
Davidson disagrees with this conclusion. The basics of his defense against the preceding 
are the following facts: Neither the court nor I.T.D. ever sent Davidson written notice of the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 49-1505 (6). Indeed, such notice is never sent out to any motorist. 
As due process requires adequate notice along with opportunity for a hearing, Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), Davidson 
cannot be held responsible for not utilizing the appellate procedure of§ 49-1505 (6). The State's 
failure to inform Davidson of his appellate options under the statute violated his Due Process 
rights. That the statute is "on the books" and there for any motorist to discover does not 
constitute adequate notice. Hence, Davidson's license was suspended without due process. 
However, even if the state had sent Davidson notice of this post-suspension procedure, his 
license was still suspended without due process, because in this particular instance, due process 
requires a pre-suspension hearing. Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). 
Secondly and finally, the above argument can be used as a defense to the charge of DWP; 
it is not barred under the theory of collateral estoppel or failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. In general, Davidson agrees with the principle of failure to exhaust, but an exception 
must always be made when it is alleged that the process itself violates due process. 
Fundamentally, how can a person be expected to comply with a statutory process that they allege 
to be unconstitutional for lack of procedural safeguards? When such an allegation is made, the 
court should first make a determination whether the suspect process violates due process. If not, 
failure to exhaust would be a factor. If the court finds the process unconstitutional, failure to 
exhaust would not come into play. The District Court overlooked precedents from the Supreme 
Court of Washington that very specifically deal with the issue of collateral estoppel and failure to 
exhaust remedies in DWP cases. The cases cited in the Appellant's district court brief were State 
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v. Dolson, 138 Wash.2d 773, 783, 982 P.2d 100, 105 (1999), and Redmond v. Moore, 151 
Wash.2d 664, 670, 91 P.3d 875, 879 (2004) which both held that a failure to challenge a license 
suspension at the time it was issued did not bar a due process challenge as a defense to the 
charge of DWP. In his Supreme Court Appellant's Brief, (pp. 22-23) Davidson buttressed these 
arguments by providing the additional citations of State v. Betschart, 2005 WL 1177580, 1-2 
(Wash.App. Div. 2); State v. Storhoff, 133 Wash.2d 523, 946 P.2d 783, 785 (1997); State v. 
Whitney, 78 Wash.App. 506, 514, 897 P.2d 374, review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1003, 907 P.2d 
297 (1995); City of Seattle v. Foley, 56 Wash.App. 485, 488, 784 P.2d 176, review denied, 114 
Wash.2d 1016, 791 P.2d 534 (1990); State v. Baker, 49 Wash.App. 778, 782, 745 P.2d 1335 
(1987), statutory abrogation recognized by State v. Rogers, 127 Wash.2d 270, 276, 898 P.2d 294 
(1995); State v. Thomas, 25 Wash.App. 770, 610 P.2d 937 (1980); State v. Summers, 120 Wn.2d 
801, 810, 846 P.2d 490 (1993); Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wash.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975); and 
Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 68 P. 757 (1902). This extensive caselaw from our sister state 
supports the idea that a conviction for DWP cannot be achieved if the original license suspension 
violated a defendant's due process rights. The State of Idaho provided no contradictory caselaw 
from this or any other jurisdiction. Fundamentally, the District Court misconstrued Davidson's 
defense. Davidson is not so much challenging the original suspension 1; he is challenging the 
process by which his license became suspended. 
3. 
OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN IDAHO'S TRAFFIC COURT 
The above constitutes a general summary of Davidson's rebuttal to the main holding of 
the District Court's memorandum (and for that matter, the State's argument). Of course, as 
1 Davidson does include argument relating to the fact that his license should never have been suspended in the first 
place. If Davidson's procedural due process rights had not been violated, and he had been granted a valid hearing to 
contest his license suspension, he would have had a valid, substantive argument. Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-21. But 
the fact that his license should never have been suspended at all is secondary to the overall argument that the entire 
process by which a license is suspended for failure to pay a fine is unconstitutional. Again, the District Court did 
not seem to notice the distinction. 
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demonstrated by the Appellant's opening brief, he has numerous arguments and extensive 
research that he believes will warrant a reversal. Davidson has appeared in front of the Idaho 
Supreme Court once before. Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 151 P.3d 812 (2006). There 
are parallels between the two cases. In both cases, what appeared to the Appellant to be a simple 
issue would get absolutely no traction in the lower courts. This caused the Appellant to perform 
extensive research in order to vindicate his position. Again, in both cases, the research 
uncovered far-reaching problems with the administration and enforcement of the laws at issue, 
which extended far past the Appellant's personal case. 
The reason for these systemic problems in the administration of the various laws in the 
two cases appears to be identical -- a lack in developed caselaw at the Supreme Court level. 
Davidson v. Wright, id., was a case about municipal initiative law. The Idaho Supreme Court 
had only decided three other cases on that subject in the last 100 years. The Appellant's 
immediate case deals with driver's license suspensions for failure to pay infraction fines (LC. § 
49-1505), and the misdemeanor charge of Driving Without Privileges. Infraction cases rarely 
make it to the Idaho Supreme Court. Defendants are not entitled to public defenders, and to 
retain a private attorney is cost-prohibitive, as appealing an infraction case to the Idaho Supreme 
Court might cost around 1000 times the amount of the original ticket. Similarly, Driving 
Without Privileges cases (LC. § 18-8001) cases are rarely taken to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Prosecutors will regularly tend to plead down a DWP to an Invalid License charge, which 
usually carries a fine with no jail time - an offer too good to refuse for most defendants. Public 
defenders (as aptly demonstrated in this case) do not want to put in the effort to challenge the 
legitimacy of DWP laws. And again, hiring a private attorney is cost prohibitive, as the costs of 
their services would far outweigh the cost of the original fine. Idaho Code § 49-1505 is one of 
many suspension statutes, something of a bridge between an infraction and a DWP. When you 
consider that indigency plays a large role in drivers' license suspensions (inability to pay the 
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original citation leads to suspension which leads to a DWP) it becomes apparent that the class of 
people most likely to be charged with DWP are the least likely to be able to afford competent 
counsel. Therefore, despite the fact that many thousands of Idahoans find their driver's license 
suspended each year, virtually no challenges to these suspensions make their way to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. (The one exception seems to be challenges to DUI-related suspensions, as 
apparently alcoholism knows no socioeconomic boundaries.) In 2005 alone, over 65,000 
Idahoans had their driver's licenses suspended.2 The most common suspension was pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 for failure to pay an infraction penalty, accounting for over 19,000 
individual suspensions. Yet, in the history of the Idaho Supreme Court, not one case has been 
presented to it calling for a constitutional analysis of the statute3• Even more astounding is that 
no such cases have been brought to the Supreme Court since 2004 - the year that the Supreme 
Court of Washington found a similar statutory scheme unconstitutional. The case of Redmond v. 
Moore 151 Wash.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004) figures prominently into Davidson's defense, and 
is extensively analyzed in his opening brief. The Redmond court recognized the inherent risk of 
illegal suspensions that can occur within a massive traffic court bureaucracy: 
"With regard to risk of error, DOL notes it issued 386,114 notices 
of suspension in 1999, 401,471 in 2000, and 391,265 in 2001, 
based on information it received from the courts. Although the 
record does not include statistical evidence of the rate of error, the 
record does provide the illustrative examples of errors discussed 
above. Those examples, taken in conjunction with the sheer 
volume of information DOL receives from the courts, weigh 
heavily in favor of Moore and Wilson's argument that the risk of 
error under the current legislative scheme is substantial." 
Redmond, at 674. That no Idaho attorney has apparently even attempted to use this precedent to 
defend a client against a DWP charge is a shocking indictment on both the legal profession in 
2 Article: Stuck in the System -- How Idaho's traffic laws lead to ruin for the poor; by Will Schmeckpeper, Boise 
Weekly, January 4, 2006. See Exhibit 'A.' Online at: http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/stuck-in-the-
system/Content?oid=92549l 
3 Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966) involved a completely different version of§ 49-1505 
-- one that dealt with insurance requirements. 
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this state, and on the lack of checks and balances inherent in Idaho's traffic court system. 
So, as in Davidson v. Wright, it is once again up to a crusading prose litigant to unravel 
a legal morass that has been left to fester by Idaho's legal establishment. Instead of crafting a 
narrow argument focusing specifically on the facts of the Appellant's situation, Davidson has 
expanded his argument to include broad constitutional questions, for which the resolution of such 
will affect the rights of thousands. As stated by author Will Schmeckpeper in the article "Stuck 
in the System - How Idaho's traffic laws lead to ruin for the poor": 
"Until the Idaho Legislature chooses to rethink their stance on 
driving laws and how they affect our ever-growing lower 
economic class, the city of Boise considers overhauling its public 
transportation system, or public defenders are allowed the time and 
resources to present more thorough representation for their clients, 
everyone interviewed agrees, the "Joes" of our society are likely to 
be stuck where the economically downtrodden have always been 
stuck: fighting the system ... and losing." 
Boise Weekly, January 4, 2006 (Exhibit 'A'). The fourth option for the "Joes" is for the Idaho 
Supreme Court to give a thorough review of LC. § 49-1505 and to ferret out the due process 
violations that are contributing to the "ruin of the poor." 
4. 
ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL SUSPENSION PROCESS AND 
THE ACTIONS DAVIDSON TOOK PURSUANT TO IT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The State's argument (which, as pointed out before, is nothing but the incorporation of 
the District Court's memorandum) places much weight on actions taken or neglected by 
Davidson when dealing with the suspension of his driver's license. Although the original 
infractions, the suspension that occurred as a failure to pay the judgment, and the attempted 
appeal of such all fall under different case numbers, they are still necessarily a part of this case. 
See MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL, pp. 1 4. (R. Vol. 1. pp. 139 et.seq.) The actions of 
the Appellant in the other case were touched upon in the opening brief. Because of the focus of 
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the State and the lower court on the specifics of those actions, it will necessary for Davidson to 
analyze those actions in greater detail. This will give the Appellant a better opportunity to 
document the legal problems with Idaho's infraction penalty enforcement scheme. Davidson can 
show that much of the process is unconstitutional. However, the Appellant will also show that 
even if the enforcement scheme is completely legal, it was not foliowed in Davidson's case, 
which in tum violated his right to due process, rendering the suspension invalid for purposes of 
charging him with DWP. 
B. THE WRITTEN OPINIONS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THIS BRIEF 
For purposes of analysis, it will be important to note all the adverse written opinions to 
Davidson's arguments that have so far occurred in this case. Between the infraction and DWP 
cases, there have four adverse court opinions and two briefs filed by the opposing party. 
Written decisions: 
1) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVER'S LICENSE PENDING APPEAL, Case No. T0724995, issued March 19, 
2008, Honorable John T. Hawley, Magistrate.4 
2) NOTICE OF lKTEXT TO DISMISS APPEAL AXD DENYL'JG 'MOTIOX TO WAIVE FEES, 
Case No. H0800230, issued March 31, 2008, Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 
3) MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case No. M0716222, issued 
May 14, 2009, Honorable Thomas P. Watkins, Magistrate Judge (R. Vol.I, pp. 49 - 53). 
4) MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL, Case No. MO? 16222, issued October 1, 
2010, Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge (R. Vol.1, pp. 139 - 151). 
Briefs: 
5) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, Case No. M0716222, filed February 26, 2010, Jared B 
Stubbs, Assistant Boise City Attorney (R. Vol.1, pp.124 - 134). 
4 Davidson will attempt to place this document. and others resulting from the original suspension, into the record. 
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6) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, Case No. 38266, filed September 28, 2011, Nicole L. 
Schafer, Deputy Attorney General. 
With respect to opinion number 2 above, virtually all of it was reprinted verbatim in 
opinion number 4. As such the opinion does not need to he analyzed separately and is not 
included in the record. With respect to document number 6, as stated previously, it simply 
incorporates number 4 as its argument. Therefore it does not need to he referred to separate! y in 
the following analysis. That leaves us with four separate written documents (three court 
opinions and one state's brief) which may he discussed in the next section. 
C. INCONSISTENT RULES REGARDING PAYMENT AFTER JUDGMENT ON INFRACTIONS 
Before we proceed through the chronology of events in the proceedings below - along a 
detailed analysis of each step taken - we must preface the discussion with an examination of the 
"payment demand" provisions currently in place. 
If a person who receives an infraction citation does not appear before the clerk (or mail in 
payment) before the date specified on the ticket, a default judgment is entered and a notice is sent 
to the person demanding payment by a certain date, generally two weeks from the date of the 
notice. Idaho Infraction Rule 8 (c). The notice also states that the person may appear in front of 
the clerk before the payment date and schedule a hearing to show why their driver's license 
should not he suspended for failure to pay a fine. I.LR. 8 (d). This is also what happens when an 
individual first appears on an infraction citation, schedules a trial, hut then fails to appear at the 
trial.5 This is an appropriate process, as it notifies an individual that they must pay their fine by a 
5 When a person making a first appearance on an infraction citation requests a trial from the clerk, they are given a 
notice which contains the trial date. The notice also contains the following: 
"THIS CHARGE IS AN INFRACTION - YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you do not appear in court at said 
time and place for trial, judgment will be entered against you for the infraction violation in the sum of $_. In 
addition, a copy of the judgment will be forwarded to the Idaho Department of Transportation which may count as 
driver violation points against you, or be forwarded to your home state pursuant to the Interstate Nonresident 
Violator Compact. IF YOU THEREAFTER FAIL TO PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE, YOUR DRIVER'S 
LICENSE MAY ALSO BE SUSPENDED IF THIS IS A TRAFFIC INFRACTION." 
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date certain, and informs them that they may request a hearing prior to the payment date. 
Now, what happens when an individual schedules a court trial on an infraction citation, 
appears, and is found guilty? When is their payment due? Is the process the same as in a default 
judgment? A review of the rules reveals an important inconsistency: there is no rule governing 
payment after trial. 
Idaho Infraction Rule 9 (a) gives four scenarios in which the court will enter a judgment 
against the recipient of an infraction citation: 
Entry of Judgment. Upon, (1) the entry of an admission to an 
infraction citation or complaint in person or by mail under Rule 
6(a) or, (2) the payment of the total amount, which includes fixed 
penalty and court costs, by the defendant, or, (3) a finding by the 
court upon trial that the defendant committed the infraction 
offense, or, (4) a failure of the defendant to appear in court or 
before the clerk as provided in Rule 8, the court shall enter 
judgment against the defendant for the infraction which shall order 
the defendant to pay the fixed penalty and court costs provided in 
this mle. 
The rule states that the court shall "order the defendant to pay," but does not say when 
payment is due. With respect to scenario 4 above, we know when payment is due. The clerk 
sends a default notice with a definitive payment date that is not less than 14 days from the date of 
the notice. I.LR. 8 (c). But what of scenario 3? Is payment also due within 14 days? When is 
payment due after a finding of guilt at trial? No rule addresses this subject. To add to the 
confusion, Idaho Infraction Rule 10 (a) states: 
Suspension of License. If a defendant fails to pay a traffic 
infraction, ( 1) within the time allowed by a Notice of Default 
Judgment under Rule 8(d), or (2) within the time allowed by 
Deferred Payment Agreement under Rule 9(f), or (3) within such 
further time as allowed by order of the court; then, unless the court 
makes a finding under Rule 11 that the defendant has shown that 
the defendant has complete and continuing financial inability to 
pay, the court shall sign a notice of nonpayment and send it to the 
This notice is problematic, because it does not inform the individual that they have a right to a hearing prior to their 
license being suspended for failure to pay. 
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Department of Transportation for suspension of defendant's 
driver's license as provided by law. 
This rule is correct for scenario 1 & 2 above. But 1 & 2 do not address failure to pay 
after a court trial on an infraction. Scenario 3 is "within such further time as allowed by order of 
the court ... " What does this mean? Can a defendant motion the court for additional time to pay a 
fine - more time than the rules allow? In any event, none of the three scenarios from Rule 10 
address when payment is due after trial. When an individual is found guilty at trial (at least in 
Ada County) the court does not then hand the defendant a notice similar to the default notice -
stating that payment must be made by a date certain, and failure to do so will result in a license 
suspension, but the individual has the right to a hearing to show cause why their license should 
not be suspended for failure to pay. Why does the court not do this? And why is there no rule 
creating a procedure for payment after a trial when there is a procedure for every other scenario? 
The Appellant does not have an answer to these questions. 
At this point, the question inevitable follows: How exactly do traffic courts interpret 
these rules and how do they implement a procedure that is not on the books, but should be? The 
infraction citation that led to the suspension of Davidson's driver's license was processed 
through the Ada County Magistrate Court. The Appellant cannot speak to the processes of other 
county courts. Additionally, the Appellant does not know if procedures vary from judge to judge 
within Ada County. But within the court that Davidson was found guilty of the infraction, the 
process seemed to be as follows: After trial, a defendant must pay the penalty before 5 PM that 
day. Failure to do so triggers a notice of non-payment to the Transportation Department, 
bypassing any notice being sent to the defendant apprising him of his right to a show cause 
hearing. 
The lack of an actual, articulated process contained in the Idaho Court Rules for dealing 
with payment after infraction trials raises serious due process concerns with statewide 
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implications. How can a motorist comply with a process that doesn't exist? 
The next step is to discuss what the process should be. In light of the statutory scheme 
already in place, the answer is obvious: all traffic court defendants should be treated equally. A 
motorist who receives an infraction who forgets to make an initial appearance should be 
processed the same way as a motorist who appears at an infraction trial and is found guilty but 
who doesn't pay. Both should receive notices that demand payment by a date certain, but also 
inform the defendants of their right to a show cause hearing. To not send such a "show cause" 
notice to trial-attending defendants who fail to pay is both a violation of their due process rights 
(as articulated in the many cases cited in the Appellant's brief), their equal protection rights, and 
is a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1505, which requires such a notice be sent prior to suspension 
of a driver's license for failure to pay. In summary, when a defendant is found guilty at an 
infraction trial, the court should give them notice of when payment is due. It might be due at the 
end of the day, or in two weeks. If the defendant fails to make the payment by the specified date, 
they should receive a notice from the court that states that they must pay the penalty by a certain 
date, or their driver's license will be suspended. But the notice should also state that they have a 
right to request a hearing to show cause why their license should not be suspended for failure to 
pay. Essentially, it would be the same notice as the default notice specified in I.LR. 8. Traffic 
courts around the state should immediately implement this policy in order to protect the due 
process rights of their citizens, but until an actual process is inserted into the court rules, a dark 
cloud of unconstitutionality will hover over each courthouse. 
D. THE STEPS TAKEN BY DAVIDSON AFTER CONVICTION 
With the above analysis in mind, we proceed to examine the specific steps taken by both 
the court and the Appellant following his conviction of the underlying infraction. 
1) The Court fails to give Davidson proper notice after conviction. Davidson 
was convicted at trial of two infractions on July 23, 2007 (Case No. T0724995.) The court gave 
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him no notice of when payment would be due. However, it became apparent that the court 
believed that payment was due on the same day. The "Notice of Nonpayment" sent by the court 
to the Transportation Department (see Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 'B') states that "judgment was 
entered against the above-named defendant on July 23, 2007 ... and that said defendant was given 
until July 23, 2007 and has failed and refused to pay the penalty." The Appellant believes that 
courts, in failing to notify those convicted of infractions at trial of when payment is due, violate 
the due process rights of defendants. 
It is clear Davidson did not pay the penalty on July 23, 2007. On July 241\ an automatic 
default notice should have been generated by the court and mailed to the defendant. This was 
not done in Davidson's case, and it is believed that this is never done for defendants who fail to 
pay after trial, because as discussed previously, there is no rule addressing this issue anywhere 
in the infraction rules. Failure to send Davidson this notice violated his due process rights. 
There is also no question that state law requires that such notice be sent. According to Idaho 
Code § 49-1505, a notice of nonpayment cannot be sent to the Department unless a defendant 
has received "notice and hearing, or opportunity for hearing." Even on the very "Notice of 
Nonpayment" itself - the one that was filed against Davidson by the magistrate court - the court 
must certify that the defendant failed to pay the penalty "after notice of judgment and 
opportunity for hearing," or "after hearing and finding by the court that the defendant does not 
have a complete and continuing financial inability to pay the penalty." Strangely enough, neither 
box is checked. (This should have been grounds for I.T.D. to refuse to process the suspension.)6 
To summarize: After conviction, Davidson never received a notice of payment date, or 
notice and opportunity for hearing from the court on why his license should not be suspended for 
failure to pay, and it is likely that courts never send this notice out to anyone similarly situated. 
6 It should also be pointed out that the "Notice of Nonpayment," form that Ada County sends out on a regular basis, 
(the form of which is specified in I.LR. 10), does not contain the mandatory certification that the judgment is not for 
a bicycle or pedestrian infraction, pursuant to Idaho Code § 49- I 505. 
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As such, his due process rights were violated and the driver's license suspension was invalid, 
which means it can not be used to convict him for Driving Without Privileges. 
2) Davidson flies a Motion for Discharge of Judgment. At the time, Davidson 
had some inkling of the procedural problems contained in the infraction rules, although nowhere 
near the level of understanding he currently has, and so instead of waiting for a notice that he 
suspected may never come, and in an attempt to stave off a suspension of his license, Davidson, 
indigent at the time, filed a motion three days after his court trial on the infraction citation. The 
motion was entitled "Motion for Discharge of Judgment" and was filed pursuant to Idaho 
Infraction Rule 9 and/or 117• Rule 9 contains a provision similar to the "complete and 
continuing financial inability" provision of Rule 11: 
(g) Discharge of Judgment. If, after entry of a judgment for the 
payment of a penalty, court costs or payment of money to any 
person or entity, the court determines that the unpaid portion of the 
judgment is not reasonably collectible for any reason, the court 
may enter an order discharging the judgment and close the file. A 
discharge of a judgment on a citation may be entered by endorsing 
the word "discharged" on the face of the citation together with the 
date and the signature of the court. 
It is questionable whether or not the "discharge" provision of Rule 9 is actually 
something that can be converted into a motion and filed by a defendant. The wording seems to 
indicate that a "discharge" is an administrative decision to be made by the courts without any 
input from the defendant. On the other hand, Rule 11 governs the "show cause" hearings 
discussed previously. It states: 
(a) Show Cause Hearing. A show cause hearing as to whether a 
defendant's driver's license should be suspended for nonpayment of 
a penalty shall be held by the court, (1) if a defendant appears in 
court at the time indicated in a Deferred Payment Agreement made 
under Rule 9(f), or (2) if the defendant requests a hearing before 
the payment date for a penalty as authorized under a Notice of 
Default Judgment issued under Rule 8(d), or (3) at any other time 
in the discretion of the court. The show cause hearing shall be an 
7 To be added to the record. 
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evidentiary hearing to determine if the defendant has the complete 
and continuing financial inability to pay the penalty. The defendant 
shall testify under oath and be subject to cross examination. 
Much like the rule analyzed before, this rule makes no mention of the scenario where a 
defendant is found guilty at trial but then does not pay. Scenario 1 & 2 are fine, in both those 
cases defendants would have received the notice informing them of their right to a show cause 
hearing. But failing to grant the same hearing to someone who shows up to trial would violate 
due process and equal protection. The third option above states that a show cause hearing can be 
held "at any other time in the discretion of the court." This curious catch-all provision raises 
some interesting questions. Firstly, why is no defendant ever given notice of it? None of the 
notices sent out by the court ever mention this provision. How far does "at any other time" 
extend into the future? If a defendant misses the deadline to request a hearing as stated in their 
default notice, can they still request one using this provision? 
Next, we must analyze the attributes of a show cause hearing. Perhaps the most 
important attribute of the show cause hearing is the automatic stay of license suspension 
proceedings. While no rule explicitly states that a "stay" is part-and-parcel of a show cause 
hearing, there is a strong inference based on the wording of the rule. See, e.g., I.I.R. 10 (a), I.LR. 
11 (a), LC.§ 49-1505 (1). So, when the court received Davidson's "Motion for Discharge of 
Judgment," (assuming they were treating it as a motion for a show cause hearing), the court 
should have immediately stayed the license suspension process in Davidson's case, pending the 
outcome of the show cause hearing. What was the result of the motion? On August 2, 2007, the 
court entered an order which states, "Denied, all data is stale: 2006. Must submit current 
financial affidavit." 8 Davidson had included older financial information with his motion, but his 
motion clearly stated that the information was still relevant and applicable. Further, there does 
not appear to be any rule that states that financial information has to be current, if the movant 
8 To be added to the record. 
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attests that the same numbers are still relevant. In any event, the court's response did not seem to 
end the matter, even though it said "Denied" on the face of it. It ordered Davidson to submit a 
current financial affidavit. It did not give a deadline. It gave no other instructions. In apparently 
treating Davidson's motion as a motion for a show cause hearing, the court should have stayed 
all license suspension actions pending the outcome of the eventual hearing. What actually 
happened? The court ordered Davidson to submit a current financial affidavit on August 2. On 
August 27, Davidson filed the affidavit. Unbeknownst to Davidson, however, the week before, 
on August 22, the court had sent a "Notice of Nonpayment" to the Transportation Department. 
(The notice seems to have been generated on August 9 -- just seven days after the court sent 
Davidson the request for an additional affidavit. See Appellant's brief, Exhibit 'B.') This is the 
notice that directly triggers the suspension of an individual's driver's license. Once again, 
Davidson's rights had been violated, as the suspension was done without due process of law. 
The court did however schedule Davidson a hearing after he filed his updated affidavit. The 
show cause hearing was set for September 28t\ 2007, eleven days after the Department of 
Transportation started the suspension of Davidson's driver's license. On September 28t\ the 
court denied Davidson's motion at hearing. On November 29, Davidson was arrested for DWP. 
3) Davidson files a Motion for a Show Cause Hearing. On December 10, 2007, 
Davidson filed another motion for a show cause hearing (this one was actually titled "Motion for 
Show Cause Hearing), alleging not indigency, as before, but rather some of the various due 
process violations that were analyzed in these appeal briefs. On February 6, 2008, the motion 
was denied. 
One of the arguments against Davidson's position is that he received two hearings before 
the magistrate: the motion to discharge (indigency) hearing, and the motion for show cause 
(constitutional issues) hearing. How can Davidson claim he was denied due process when he 
received two hearings before the magistrate? This was raised by the magistrate in the 
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"MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS," (R.Vol.1, p. 51.) In dealing with the second 
motion first - the "show cause motion" - it should be noted that Davidson was asking the court 
to not suspend his license for failure to pay the penalty on the grounds that his due process rights 
had been violated, and because the law had not authorized a suspension of his license in the first 
place, as he had only been convicted of non-moving violations. Those very requests disqualified 
Davidson's motion. He had no authority to file it and the court had no authority to rule on it. 
Why? Because the ONLY grounds for a show cause hearing is indigency. Idaho Infraction Rule 
11 directly ties the show cause hearing to indigency. There is no current process on the books 
that allows an individual to bring issues other than indigency to a court prior to the suspension of 
a license. The magistrate did not possess the authority under the court rules to consider anything 
other than indigency. This lack of a viable process was discussed extensively by the Appellant 
in his brief, pages 15 - 17. And yet, the lower court found that the existence of the Rule 11 show 
cause hearing saves § 49-1505 from being found unconstitutional. 
"Davidson cites this court to Redmond v. Moore 151 Wash.2d 664, 
91 P.3d 875 (2004) in support of his claims. In Redmond, the court 
did uphold the dismissal of a charge of driving without privileges 
against the defendants, finding that Washington provided no pre-
suspension hearing for a driver to challenge his suspension for 
failure to pay fines. This case is not applicable, however, since 
Washington State provided no mechanism for hearing prior to the 
suspension of one's driving privileges. Idaho Infraction Rules 10 
and 11 clearly provide what the State of Washington did not." 
R.Vol.1, p.52. But what the court fails to realize is that an "indigency only" hearing is not 
sufficient to protect against improper suspensions. Nowhere in the Redmond case did the 
defendants make the claim that they were denied an indigency hearing. They demanded a 
hearing that could address "ministerial errors that might occur when DOL processes information 
obtained from the courts pertaining to license suspensions and revocations, e.g., 
misidentification, payments credited to the wrong account, the failure of the court to provide 
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updated information when fines are paid." Id. at 674-75. Rule 11 does not protect the due 
process rights of a defendant. 
With respect to the first "discharge" hearing, as shown before, Davidson received no 
notice of his right to have a hearing. Further, his license was suspended before the hearing ever 
took place. In this instance, due process demands that the hearing be held before the suspension 
of the license. Overall, Davidson has demonstrated that the process in the Idaho Court Rules for 
dealing with 1) payments after trials, 2) notices, and 3) hearings, is so completely defective, that 
its very nature violates the right to due process that is guaranteed to all citizens. One cannot be 
sanctioned for attempting to navigate through a defective process, and failing to choose an option 
which doesn't exist, but should. 
4) Davidson's failure to utilize I. C. § 49-1505 (6). Much was made in the lower 
court about Davidson's failure to proceed under Idaho Code § 49-1505 ( 6) after his license was 
suspended. The law states as follows: 
Any person whose driver's license has been suspended under this 
section may appeal to the district court in the county where the 
infraction judgment was entered within the time and in the manner 
provided for criminal appeals from the magistrates division to the 
district court. The appeal shall be expedited as provided by rule of 
the supreme court. If the district court finds that the notice of 
nonpayment of the infraction penalty should not have been sent to 
the department for suspension of the driver's license, privileges or 
permit, the district court shall order the privileges be reinstated by 
the department and upon receipt of a copy of such order the 
department shall reinstate the privileges without payment of a fee. 
In her "MEMORANDUM DECISIO~ ON APPEAL,"9 Judge Copsey states, " ... Davidson 
admitted that he had received the notice form the Department of Transportation issued on August 
28, 2007, but failed to avail himself of the judicial review process provided in LC. § 49-1505 ( 6) 
... Therefore, any challenge to the decision to suspend his license for his failure to pay fees had to 
be filed in the District Court within forty-two (42) days of the Notice dated August 28, 2007 .... 
9 Case No. M0716222, issued October I, 2010, Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge (R. Vol.I, pp. 139-151). 
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He failed to exhaust his remedies afforded him under the statute, LC. § 49-1505 (6)." 
Memorandum, pp. 6-7. The magistrate court, in "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVER'S LICENSE PENDING APPEAL," 10 wrote, 
"This court previously ruled that Defendant failed to avail himself of the judicial review 
provided in LC. Section 49-1505 (6). Having failed to timely appeal or seek judicial review of 
the suspension of driving privileges Defendant cannot now claim that he was denied due 
process." Memorandum, p. 3. 
Davidson spent time in his brief arguing his failure utilize post suspension procedures 
should not bar his due process defense against the charge of driving without privileges. 
Extensive authority was cited, e.g., "An invalid revocation cannot later support a conviction for 
driving with a revoked license, even if (defendant] had knowledge of the underlying 
suspension." State v. Dolson, 138 Wash.2d 773, 783, 982 P.2d 100, 105 (1999). Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 22-24. 
The lower court's focus on § 49-1505 (6) warrants an analysis of the section. Primarily, 
it can be noted that§ 49-1505 (6) is a post-suspension process. The vast majority of Davidson's 
brief is dedicated to the proposition that due process requires a pre-suspension hearing in this 
case. In the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 11 ' the court holds that an individual is not 
entitled to a pre-suspension hearing after failing to pay an infraction fine. The court cites the 
correct cases, but does not perform the analysis required by the cases. Rather, they are taken at 
face value and applied to Davidson's case. This is not what the U.S. Supreme Court intended. 
The lower court correctly cites to Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 
(1966), and Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) for the 
proposition that "the legislature may, where a compelling public interest justifies the action, 
1° Case No. T0724995, issued March 19, 2008, Honorable John T. Hawley, Magistrate. 
11 Case No. 10724995, issued March 19, 2008, Honorable John T. Hawley, Magistrate. 
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provide for summary action (pre-hearing suspension of driving privileges) subject to later 
judicial review of the validity thereof." Memorandum, p. 3. Both these cases dealt with driver's 
license suspensions. However, there are likely a dozen or more ways in which a driver's license 
can be suspended. Each type of suspension has to be analyzed separately. There is no "blanket 
rationale" for all driver's license suspensions. (Quite a chasm between suspending a license for 
drunk driving and suspending for failure to pay an infraction penalty.) Yet, the lower court takes 
the justifications of the Adams and Dixon courts and applies them to Davidson's case, without 
even discussing the vagaries of the particular type of suspension Davidson was subjected to. The 
first step of an Adams I Dixon analysis is to identify the compelling state interest for the 
suspension. The second step is to determine whether public safety would be put at risk by 
affording a defendant a pre-suspension hearing. In Adams, the compelling state interest was "to 
protect the public using the highways against hardship which may result from use of automobiles 
by financially irresponsible persons." 12 In Dixon, the compelling state interest was "safety on the 
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard." 431 U.S. at 114. In both 
cases, the courts went on to determine that a pre-suspension hearing was not required, as it would 
affect public safety. Meanwhile, nowhere in their decision does the lower court attempt to 
identify Idaho's compelling state interest for the suspension of a driver's license for failure to 
pay a fine without a prior hearing. In fact, throughout the entire proceedings of this litigation, 
neither the state nor the court has attempted to identify a compelling state interest in pre-hearing 
suspensions for failure to pay. In their brief, the state simply restates the compelling interest 
from Dixon and seems to imply that it applies in the current case, despite the fact that the 
suspensions in the two cases were completely different. "As has been stated, the purpose of 
Idaho's suspension statute is to assure the effective administration and safety of its roads and 
12 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (l 971) -- decided five years after Adams -- likely 
overturns the main holding in that case. Bell analyzed a similar statutory scheme, but determined that public safety 
was not an issue, and as such a defenda,1t was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing. 
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highways. See Dixon v. Love." RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, (R. Vol.I, p.131). On its face, how can 
one say the purpose of the state of Idaho's statute is identical to the state of Illinois statute? The 
analysis is also absurd, because the "suspension statute" in Dixon was related to a violation of 
points system, while in the Appellant's case, the suspension was for failure to pay an infraction 
fine. One involves public safety, the other does not. Only the Appellant has attempted to offer 
what the state's interest may be in these types of suspensions. The Supreme Court of 
Washington, in analyzing an identical statutory scheme, held: 
"The State's interest in suspending an individual's driver's license 
for failing to appear, pay, or comply with a notice of traffic 
infraction is in the efficient administration of traffic regulations 
and in ensuring offending drivers appear in court, pay applicable 
fines, and comply with court orders." 
Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 677, 91 P.3d 875, 882 (2004). The Appellant believes 
that - at most - this can also be the compelling state interest for Idaho's suspension for failure-
to-pay statute. However, it is not for the Appellant to say what the state's interests are. That was 
the job of the Attorney General's office, and they failed to do so in their Respondent's brief. 
But, if the above is applicable to Idaho, then in proceeding to the "public safety step" of an 
Adams I Dixon analysis, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Washington went on to say 
in Redmond, supra., "Although undoubtedly important, this interest does not rise to the level of 
the State's compelling interest in keeping unsafe drivers off the roadways. Simply put, failing to 
resolve a notice of traffic infraction does not pose the same threat to public safety as habitually 
unsafe drivers do." Id. at 677. It is clear from the caselaw that Davidson was entitled to a pre-
suspension hearing, and the post-suspension process of § 49-1505 (6) does not meet the due 
process requirement. It is therefore irrelevant whether Davidson made use of the § 49-1505 (6) 
process or not. And of course, neither the court nor the state of Idaho has attempted to explain 
the inconsistency of how a motorist can be guaranteed a pre-suspension indigency hearing, but 
not a pre-suspension hearing on any other matter, on the grounds of administrative efficiency. Is 
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it efficient to have one hearing pre-suspension and one post-suspension? If efficiency is the goal, 
then a motorist should be entitled to both hearings pre-suspension, and there is no reason they 
could not be consolidated. In other words, if an individual neglects to pay their infraction 
penalty, they should receive a notice from the court informing them of their right to a hearing, 
where they can raise both indigency or any other legal issue at the same time. 
5) Additional legal problems with I. C. § 49-1505 (6). There are several additional 
problems with Idaho Code§ 49-1505 (6). 
The law states, "Any person whose driver's license has been suspended under this section 
may appeal to the district court ... " What exactly is an individual appealing? The ministerial 
duty of the court sending a notice of non-payment to the Transportation Department? By using 
the word "appeal" this law gives the impression that there would have been a previous hearing 
that the defendant would have been appealing from. The law also says that if the license was 
suspended "under this section ... " there is a right to an appeal. "This section" ( § 49-1505) 
mandates a hearing (or opportunity) prior to suspension proceedings. This was a hearing that the 
court never sent notice of to Davidson, as described previously. That raises an interesting 
question: If an individual, having received proper notice of their right to a "show cause" hearing, 
fails to request one in a timely fashion, and their license is suspended, would they be barred from 
then filing an appeal pursuant to § 49-1505 (6)? Is it failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 
Another important question about§ 49-1505 (6) involves the scope of the appeal. What 
issues can be raised? Because the only type of suspension hearing enumerated in the rules 
relates to indigency, it is logical to think that the scope of any appeal would also be limited to 
indigency. If the hearing were so limited, it would be unconstitutional, as previously discussed. 
The statutory scheme that seems to be set up would say that prior to the suspension of a driver's 
license for failure to pay, a defendant is entitled to a hearing to show that they cannot afford to 
pay the penalty. If the magistrate rules against them, they are entitled to an appeal pursuant to § 
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49-1505 (6). But this process violates the rights of an individual to bring up any issue other than 
indigency as a defense to the suspension of their license. 
The problems with § 49-1505 (6) continue. Part of the law states, "The appeal shall be 
expedited as provided by rule of the supreme court." An admirable attempt to speed the process 
along for an individual with a suspended license. Yet, a review of the court rules reveals that this 
"expedited process" does not exist. It would appear that the Supreme Court has never 
promulgated rules pursuant to § 49-1505 (6). Therefore, even if Davidson had attempted to 
comply with § 49-1505 (6) in a timely fashion, he would still be wandering in the wilderness. 
Nothing can be more of a violation of due process than a failure to create an actual process. 
The Appellant would also take issue with the fact that there is any deadline whatsoever 
for challenging a license suspension. "Any person whose driver's license has been suspended 
under this section may appeal to the district court in the county where the infraction judgment 
was entered within the time and in the manner provided for criminal appeals from the 
magistrates division to the district court." § 49-1505 (6). Implementing a deadline necessarily 
will have the effect of prejudging any motorist who has not received notice of the suspension. 
Consider the "evil twin" scenario: A twin takes his brother's driver's license and goes on a joy 
ride, eventually receiving a speeding ticket, then fails to pay the judgment. The twins are 
roommates, and the scofflaw brother intercepts the notices from the court addressed to his 
brother. Eventually, the innocent brother's license is suspended by I.T.D. without his 
knowledge. That brother will end up driving with a suspended license for weeks, months, or 
possibly years before he gets pulled over for an infraction and finds himself imprisoned, or 
happens to stumble upon the fact that his license has become suspended. According to the 
District Court, the innocent motorist would have no defense to the charge of DWP, because he 
failed to appeal the underlying suspension in a timely fashion pursuant to § 49-1505 (6). This 
failure to protect innocent motorists by the imposition of an arbitrary filing deadline for 
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challenging license suspensions would appear to violate the right of due process. In Reese v. 
Kassab, 334 F.Supp. 744 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1971) the court pointed out: 
"[T]hat even if the convictions cannot be contested, there still 
remain the possibilities, among others, that the convictions were 
those of another person with the same name; that the fines and 
costs were paid on an information at variance with that for which 
the minor judiciary entered a conviction as plaintiff contends 
occurred in this case; ... or that there were errors on the report of 
conviction form." 
Id. at 747. In such cases there should be no deadline to contest an improper suspension, and 
there is no compelling interest for the state to limit such a right. 
Another substantial problem with§ 49-1505 (6) is that neither the court nor I.T.D. ever 
give defendants notice of this crucial provision. Never ever. This lack of notice is a major due 
process violation. The state cannot argue that it would be burdensome to send out this additional 
notice when I.T.D. already sends out pending suspension notices, which mislead motorists into 
thinking they have no appeal rights. After I.T.D. receives a notice of non-payment from the 
court, they send out a computer generated notice to the motorist which informs them that unless 
they pay the penalty, their license will be suspended within two weeks. The form gives no 
indication that a motorist apparently has a right to appeal pursuant to § 49-1505 ( 6) 13 • By giving 
no other option than "pay or get suspended" the motorist is left with the impression that no other 
option exists. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This lack of notice is a critical due process 
violation. However, even if the notice requirements were met, it is entirely likely that it would 
not pass constitutional muster because it is still a post-suspension procedure, as opposed to a pre-
suspension procedure. 
"What is more, unlike chapter 46.20 RCW, the statute invalidated 
in Warner provided a postdeprivation right to appeal from 
suspension. See 75 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 620 ("Any person whose 
operator's license or learner's permit has been suspended, or who 
has been deprived of the privilege of applying for an operator's 
13 The notice that Davidson received is included in his opening brief as Exhibit 'A.' 
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license or learner's permit under the provisions of this act, shall 
have the right to file a petition, within thirty (30) days thereafter, 
for a hearing in the matter in the court of common pleas of the 
county in which the operator or permittee resides .... ") ... Parties 
could obtain a stay of suspension until the appeal had been heard. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scavo, 206 Pa.Super. 544, 214 A.2d 
309 (1965) (upon notice of appeal, driver obtained an order of 
supersedeas to stay suspension of his license pending outcome of 
appeal); see also In re Turney, 44 Pa.Cmwlth. 333,403 A.2d 1350, 
1351 (1979) (noting the driver's notice of suspension provided the 
following guaranty:" 'You have the right of Appeal to the Court of 
Common Pleas of the County wherein you reside within thirty (30) 
days of receipt of this notice. Notice to this Department of timely 
Appeal will stay the action herein set forth pending final outcome 
of the Appeal.' "). RCW 46.20.289 provides no such appeal 
process and even if a court schedules a hearing to correct an 
alleged error, it is unclear whether it has the authority to stay the 
suspension pending the outcome of the hearing. Thus, the 
challenged provisions of the statute in this case offer far fewer 
procedural guaranties of due process than the statute invalidated in 
Warner." 
Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 73-74, 91 P.3d 875, 80-81 (2004). The above analysis 
should make it clear that Davidson's failure to appeal his license suspension pursuant to I. C. § 
49-1505 (6) cannot be any sort of bar to raising a due process challenge as a defense to DWP. 
E. CONCLUSION: THE PROCESS IS BROKEN AND THE COURT MUST FIX IT 
The above analysis was undertaken for two purposes: 1) To review the state's process for 
suspending licenses for failure to pay from top-to-bottom, and to expose the due process 
problems with the process along the way, and 2) to demonstrate that the actions taken by 
Davidson pursuant to the defective process cannot and should not work as some sort of an 
estoppel against his right to use a due process challenge as a defense to DWP. This case gives 
the court the opportunity to correct some of the constitutional flaws in the process. 
It was never the Legislature's intent that so many Idahoans would find themselves 
arrested for DWP as a result of the traffic infraction system now in place. When the Legislature 
completely revamped the vehicle code and created the process now embodied in§ 49-1505, they 
did it with the specific intent to reduce arrests in Idaho. In the Statement of Purpose for House 
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Bill 18,14 they wrote: 
Idaho has recently enacted a Traffic Infractions Act with the stated 
purpose to reduce congestion in the court system, to improve the 
ability of peace officers to regulate and control motor vehicle 
traffic, and to achieve significant economies in the administration 
of justice. This act has made all minor traffic violations 
noncriminal in nature, and no person may be arrested or jailed for 
an infraction violation. However, an inconsistency still exists 
under the law in that a person may not be incarcerated for a traffic 
infraction, but that nonpayment of a traffic infraction may result in 
a driver's being held in contempt of court and jailed until payment 
is made. A better method of enforcement of nonpayment of 
infraction penalties is needed other than jailing people for 
nonpayment of a civil penalty . 
... Additionally, the bill sets up a new method for enforcing 
nonpayment of traffic infraction penalties, by providing that a 
driver's license may be suspended for nonpayment. This method 
of enforcement through the licensing process is more consistent 
with regulating the privilege of driving on state's highways, and 
also avoids invoking criminal-type treatment and incarceration of 
drivers for a civil violation of the state's laws. 
(Emphasis added.) The passage of time has proven this policy something of a failure, as DWP 
arrests follow "failure-to-pay" license suspensions like night follows day for far too many 
Idahoans, with indigency often the main contributing factor. In drafting the process, the 
Legislature likely assumed that it was protecting those on the lower rung of the socioeconomic 
ladder by including the provision that a defendant's license would not be suspended if they had 
"a complete and continuing financial inability to pay the penalty." It may be that this phrase sets 
a "poverty bar" a little too high. "Complete and continuing financial inability" conjures an 
image of a homeless man living under a bridge. But for an individual to receive an infraction 
citation, they likely own a car, and are able to pay for their driver's license renewal. Perhaps a 
more realistic standard would be the one the court uses to determine whether or not a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a public defender. In the article Stuck in the System -- How Idaho's 
14 HB 18 / RS 8745, 1983. LC.§ 49-3408, as added by 1983, ch. 25, § 20, p. 66. Later recodified as§ 49-1505, 
1988 Session Laws, ch. 265, § 372, p. 757. See Exhibit 'B.' 
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traffic laws lead to ruin for the poor, 15 the author, along with a former state legislator, suggests 
community service as an alternative to infraction fines. This may better suit the needs of Idaho's 
working poor. Whatever the answer, it is clear that it would be a policy decision for the 
Legislature to decide. The court must deal with the law as written. But when interpreting § 49-
1505, the court should always keep in mind the intent of the Legislature who wrote it. That body 
was trying to keep Idahoans out of jail. Therefore, the court should construe § 49-1505 as 
broadly as possible to give citizens every conceivable opportunity to avoid a license suspension 
through the use of constitutionally adequate notice and hearing procedures. 
This case presents several issues of first impression for the Supreme Court. The court has 
never analyzed I.C. § 49-1505 or subjected the failure-to-pay suspension process to a due process 
analysis. The court has touched on similar issues related to other suspension statutes. The 
excerpt below is from a case that dealt with an individual's failure to read a notice from l.T.D. 
that was mailed to him. The following paragraph may be instructive in the immediate case. It 
may be dicta, or it may be the smoking gun: 
"Preliminarily, we note that the deprivation of the continued 
possession of a valid driver's license is subject to due process 
requirements under the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Accordingly, a notice of suspension and an 
opportunity to be heard are mandated whenever the state seeks to 
suspend a license. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 
L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The notice must be one reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to inform the affected party of the 
impending action and to give him an opportunity to present his 
objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)." 
State v. Quenzer, 112 Idaho 756, 735 P.2d 1067, 68-69 (1987). In the case of Bell v. Burson, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a hearing was required prior to the suspension of a driver's 
license. The court of appeals goes on to state that a notice from LT.D. must give the affected 
15 Article: Stuck in the System How Idaho's traffic laws lead to ruin for the poor; by Will Schmeckpeper, Boise 
Weekly, January 4, 2006. See Exhibit 'A' Online at: http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/stuck-in-the-
system/Content?oid=92549 l 
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party an opportunity to present his objections. As shown previously, neither the "show cause" 
notice from the court, nor the "suspension" notice from I.T.D., ever notify an affected party that 
they may present their objections. In the case of the "show cause" notice, a party may only raise 
indigency; in the case of the "suspension" notice, there is no mention of an opportunity for a 
hearing whatsoever. In the Quenzer case, however, the constitutional sufficiency of the notice 
was not challenged by either party. Hopefully the court in this case will be able to do what did 
not happen in Quenzer. 
5. 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Davidson also raised a substantive due process challenge in his opening brief. The 
argument is that Davidson cannot be convicted of DWP since the original license suspension 
violated his substantive due process rights. Because the suspension of a driver's license must 
bear a reasonable relationship to the reason for granting it in the first place, § 49-1505 is 
unconstitutional, because the suspension is related to fine enforcement, as opposed to highway 
safety. The District Court made no mention of this argument in their MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON APPEAL. The only time this issue was discussed by someone other than the Appellant was in 
the City of Boise's brief on intermediate appeal. R. Vol.1, p.131. The City spends one half page 
arguing against points the Appellant never made. The City attempts to make the point that 
prohibiting pre-suspension hearings is rationally related to administrative efficiency, when 
Davidson was actually arguing that the suspension itself was not rationally related to public 
safety. The State of Idaho has provided no argument to the contrary in their brief. Davidson 
stands by his argument. 
In 1984, the Idaho Attorney General's office analyzed another suspension statute and 
found it violated both procedural and substantive due process. It determined that Idaho Code § 
18-1502 (c) - which requires I.T.D to suspend the driving privileges of any person under the age 
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of 19 who has been convicted of alcohol offenses not related to the operation of a motor vehicle 
- was unconstitutional: 
"Paragraph (c) of Idaho Code § 18-1502 is unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds-and probably on substantive due 
process grounds-because the suspension of driver's licenses of 
minors following convictions for offenses having no rational 
relationship to the operation of a motor vehicle does not 
substantially further a legitimate, articulated state purpose." 
1984 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 48 (Idaho A.G.), Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-5 (Idaho A.G.), 1984 
WL 162404 (Idaho A.G.) The Idaho Legislature subsequently made amendments to the statute, 
and in 1991 the Attorney General's office was again called upon to give an opinion of the 
statute's constitutionality. While the Attorney General felt that the procedural due process 
problems had been fixed; he also felt that the statute could still be held unconstitutional: 
"Nothing in the 1989 or 1990 amendments to this statute serves to 
cure what was identified as "the lack of a rational relation" 
between the penalty of denying driving privileges and the crime of 
possession, use, procurement, attempted procurement or 
dispensing of any beer, wine or other alcoholic beverage." 
Idaho A.G. Guideline 10/16/1991, Ref. No. 8218, online at www.ag.idaho.gov/publications/op-
guide-cert/l99l/g10169l.pdf. Similarly, the state has failed to articulate any rational 
relationship between the suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay an infraction penalty 
and highway safety. Since no rational relationship exists, the state cannot suspend an 
individual's license for failure to pay a fine. As such, Davidson's suspension was illegal, and he 
cannot be convicted of DWP. 
6. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. DAVIDSON'S COUNSEL FAILED TO OFFER ANY DEFENSE WHATSOEVER 
In his opening brief, Davidson alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. On intermediate 
appeal, the District Court ruled against this point in the MEMORANDUM DECJSION ON APPEAL, 
R.Vol.1, pp. 148-150. The District Court cites Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
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S.Ct. 2052 (1984) and performs a lengthy analysis pursuant to it. Davidson believes that 
Strickland is inapposite and unhelpful in this case. The test of Strickland is to identify errors 
made during the course of trial, to analyze if those errors fell outside the level of professional 
competence, and finally, to determine if such errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
Davidson does not attempt to point to an error here and there committed by counsel~ Davidson is 
alleging an absolute denial of the right to counsel. To put it rather bluntly, both of Davidson's 
public defenders were either too lazy, overworked, underpaid, unmotivated, or incompetent to 
offer any defense whatsoever. Davidson demanded a defense from his counsel, but they had no 
interest in anything but a plea bargain. The District Court claims that Davidson was not 
prejudiced, because he wanted a motion to dismiss filed with the court, and although counsel 
refused to file one, Davidson was able to file it himself pro se. The District Court misses the 
point. Davidson wanted some sort of legal defense. Having some legal ability, Davidson 
identified what seemed to be a valid constitutional challenge and presented it to his counsel. But 
Davidson did not know if what he discovered was the only possible defense available. There 
may be a dozen other legal defenses that could have been identified by a skilled attorney. But 
counsel refused to investigate this possibility. In fact, it seemed the only legal research done by 
either counsel was to justify their refusal to represent their client. The District Court says that 
Davidson was able to present his defense, and it was a losing defense, so it makes no difference 
that counsel did not present it. He was not prejudiced. But Davidson is not an attorney. A 
skilled attorney may have been able to take Davidson's losing motion and convert it into a 
winning motion. Certainly an attorney wouldn't have to deal with the additional hurdle of prose 
bias that occasionally occurs. It is difficult to know what the court is giving sanction to: that a 
defendant's right to counsel can be abridged if the defendant can figure out how to file his own 
motions? Davidson's counsel both claimed that the arguments he wanted to bring were 
"frivolous." The Sixth Amendment cannot possibly allow court-appointed counsel to throw up 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 33 
the "frivolous flag" as a dodge to doing some actual legal work. "A court-appointed attorney 
who believes that his or her client's appeal is without merit must still submit a brief in 
accordance with this rule." Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 963 P.2d 1159 (1998). The 
principle announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 
would seem to be applicable here: 
"[The attorney's] role as advocate requires that he support his 
client's appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds 
his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination 
of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief 
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent 
and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the 
court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full examination of all 
the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If 
it so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss 
the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or 
proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the 
other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their 
merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, 
afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal." 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). No one wants to "crack the books" if they don't 
have to. But if Davidson's counsel didn't want to do actual legal work they shouldn't have 
become attorneys. 
B. THE COURT FAILED TO SECURE A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF COUNSEL 
Davidson will further expand upon his denial of counsel claims by alleging that the court 
did not adequately inquire as to whether Davidson's waiver of counsel was intelligently made. 
On February 9, 2009, Davidson attended a pre-trial conference. At this "conference" 
Davidson sat alone in a courtroom with his second public defender, Randy Barnum. It was 
during this time that Barnum unequivocally stated that he would not reconsider filing a motion to 
dismiss on Davidson's behalf. Davidson asked to speak to the judge, but Barnum stated that the 
judge would not come out of chambers to speak with him. At this point, Davidson did not feel 
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like he had any option but to sign away his rights to counsel. Barnum returned the document to 
chambers while Davidson left. At no point did the magistrate ever question Davidson about his 
desire to proceed pro se. The Ada County Magistrate Minutes, R.Vol.l, p.41, simply state, 
"[Defendant] wishes to proceed pro se." The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
decision to waive counsel must be made knowingly and intelligently. Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); accord State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 
896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980). The standard to be applied in determining whether there has been a 
valid waiver of the right to counsel is whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
a known right, and that determination rests on the facts of each individual case. Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); State v. Ruth, 102 
Idaho 638, 642, 637 P.2d 415,419 (1981). 
"In Balough, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "In order 
to waive the right to counsel knowingly and intelligently, a 
criminal defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open." Accordingly, we have held that "[a] waiver of 
counsel cannot be knowing and intelligent unless the accused 
appreciates the possible consequences of mishandling these core 
functions and the lawyer's superior ability to perform them." 
Balough, 820 F.2d at 1487 (citations omitted)." 
State v. Coby, 128 Idaho 90,910 P.2d 762, 765 (1996) (Schroeder, dissenting.) 
"The right to private counsel is separate from the right to court-
appointed counsel. Even where there is a clear waiver, which is 
supported by findings, by a defendant of the right to a public 
defender, there still must be a separate waiver, also supported by 
findings, of the right to private counsel. Only then can it be said 
that a defendant has fully waived the right to counsel." 
State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505,873 P.2d 150 (1994). 
No such inquiries or findings were ever made in Davidson's case. If the magistrate had 
questioned Davidson on the record, Davidson would have been able to express his frustration 
with his appointed counsel. The court may have ordered Mr. Barnum to prepare a motion to 
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dismiss, it may have required him to file an Anders brief, or it may have appointed new counsel 
to Davidson's case. Finally, because of the important nature of the right to counsel, it would 
seem that the court should "re-up" the waiver at each level of appeal. A pro se defendant 
representing himself at trial may wish to have a public defender on appeal. The rule should be 
that courts must make inquiries of pro se defendants at each level of appeal, and secure a valid 
waiver each time. 
7. 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
A. THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY IMMEDIATELY JAILING DAVIDSON 
In his opening brief, Davidson argued that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in 
immediately remanding Davidson into custody after sentencing. Appellant's brief; pp. 34-38. 
On intermediate appeal, the District Court ruled against Davison on this point. R. V ol.1, p. 145-
147. Both the District Court and Davidson agree that the magistrate had the discretion to not 
immediately remand Davidson. The difference of opinion, then, is that Davidson feels that the 
magistrate believed that he did not have the discretion. The District Court feels that the 
magistrate believed he did have the discretion, and that he exercised it appropriately. Both 
Davidson and the District Court refer to the same part of the transcript, but each interprets it 
differently. The most illustrative portion of the transcript is as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, all I can tell you is that there are certain 
requirements under Rule 11 and I'm simply following the letter of 
the law here that requires that, where it is - I understand the 
practical effect in your case, but that's the way that the - the 
manner in which the rule is written up and I think I'm bound to 
follow it. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 13, L. 3. This comment was in response to Davidson begging the court to give him 
time to file his paperwork. This paragraph clearly demonstrates that the judge felt he had no 
choice but to remand Davidson pursuant to I.C.R. 11. As Davidson pointed out in his opening 
brief, there is nothing in I.CR. 11 or in any other rule that mandates an immediate remand into 
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custody of a defendant after sentencing. Therefore, the magistrate did not act "consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to him." 
B. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE SENTENCING HEARING 
The entire sentencing hearing may have violated Davidson's rights. Davidson clearly 
told the court he wished to enter a conditional plea. The court recognized Davidson's intent. Tr. 
Vol. 2, pp. 2 - 3. Yet, the court proceeds with a standard I.C.R. 11 plea process. It would seem 
that this is not a good policy. If, during a plea hearing, a defendant makes it known on the record 
that he wishes to enter a conditional plea of guilty, but has not yet filed any related documents, 
the court should stop the proceedings. Since a conditional plea requires "the approval of the 
court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney," I.C.R. 11 (a) (2), the court should 
immediately make a determination if it "approves," and then should inquire of the prosecutor if 
they consent. If so, the court should order the defendant and the prosecutor to immediately write 
out the terms of the conditional plea - a process which would take no longer than five minutes, 
especially if the conditions had been discussed in open court during the court's approval 
discussion. This should be the established rule. 
In Davidson's case, it made little sense, and may have contravened the rule, for the court, 
knowing that Davidson was attempting a conditional plea, to continue on without first obtaining 
the written conditions. If submitting written conditions is a part of the rule, then it would seem 
like if a defendant orally enters a conditional plea without the written counterpart, there is 
nowhere else for the court to go. The court must either wait for the written conditions, or the 
defendant must withdraw the request and proceed with a standard guilty plea. 
Even assuming it was appropriate for the court to proceed as it did in Davidson's case, 
there were still problems with the way the plea was accepted by the court. Firstly, it should be 
noted that Davidson entered his plea without the assistance of counsel. As stated in the previous 
section, there was never a valid waiver of counsel entered on the record. 
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"It is plain from the face of the record that the court allowed Beloit 
to plead guilty without the benefit of counsel or a valid waiver 
thereof. The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
decision to waive counsel must be made knowingly and 
intelligently . 
... Here the court did not make a finding on the record that Beloit 
was acting with the full awareness of his rights and the 
consequences of his action, nor does the record show that the court 
considered any of the LC. § 19-857 factors. In my view, this 
colloquy was insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of Beloit's right to counsel as required by Faretta and 
Clayton. 
State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992). If the entry of Davidson's plea was governed 
by I.CR. 11, then it should be examined whether or not the requirements of that rule were met. 
Five requirements must be met under I.CR. 11 (c) before a guilty plea can be accepted. A 
review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the court only met three of the requirements of 
I.CR. 11 (c), relating to the voluntariness of the plea, informing the defendant of the nature of 
the charge, and inquiring whether any promises had been made to Davidson. 16 The court did not 
advise Davidson that by pleading guilty he would be waiving certain rights, pursuant to I.CR. 11 
(c) (3). The court made some attempt to inform Davidson of "the consequences of the plea, 
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may 
apply," although these issues were discussed after Davidson had entered his guilty plea. But 
perhaps the most glaring omission of the court was failing to tell Davidson that a "direct" 
consequence of his plea would that he would be immediately incarcerated. If the court had 
notified Davidson of this consequence, he would not have pled guilty. 
In particular, "[t]he defendant should be informed of the possible 
consequences of pleading guilty including the maximum sentence 
and other direct consequences which may apply, such as the 
persistent violator statute." 98 Idaho at 36,557 P.2d at 630. Accord 
State v. Rodriguez, 117 Idaho 292, 787 P.2d 278 (1990). 
State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992) (Bistline, J., dissenting.) 
16 The court inquired about "threats or promises," but didn't ask about the other factors listed in 1.C.R. 11 (c) (5). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 38 
The plea must be entered with a full understanding of what the plea 
connotes and of its consequences. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99, 982 P.2d 
at 934; State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 
( 1991 ). In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum 
requirements of I.C.R. ll(c) in accepting guilty pleas. Ray, 133 
Idaho at 99,982 P.2d at 934; Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824 P.2d at 
111. If the record indicates that the trial court followed the 
requirements of Rule 11 ( c ), this is a prima facie showing that the 
plea is voluntary and knowing. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99, 982 P.2d at 
934; State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 460, 4 P.3d 570, 572 
(Ct.App.2000). Thus, the procedures outlined in I.C.R. l l(c) are 
intended to protect the underlying constitutional requirements that 
guilty pleas be entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P .3d 314 (2004 ). It is clear that there was never a valid waiver 
of counsel in this case. Davidson's Sixth Amendment rights were violated here. 
8. 
DAVIDSON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
Davidson has taken the unusual step of requesting attorney fees and reasonable expenses 
on appeal. This was the one issue that the State of Idaho decided to address on their own. BRIEF 
OF RESPONDENT, pp. 5 - 7. The State disagrees with Davidson that he should be awarded fees 
and expenses. Davidson requested fees and expenses based on two general theories, as stated in 
his brief. In this reply brief, Davidson will focus on his request pursuant to the P.A.G.D. 
Davidson hereby requests that this court extend the Private Attorney General Doctrine 
into the realm of criminal cases. To do so would be in the interests of justice. Any attorney 
could come along and take Davidson's research and use it for a class-action civil rights lawsuit. 
If they prevailed, they would be entitled to fees under the P.A.G.D. Why should the civil 
attorney be treated so much more favorably than the criminal defendant, when both seek to 
adjudicate the same constitutional questions? The criminal defendant risks much more than the 
civil attorney, as they have likely turned down a comfortable plea bargain to press their 
constitutional challenge. The defendant risks incarceration or other penalties by bringing their 
challenge, the civil attorney risks nothing so substantial. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court 
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should hold that a criminal defendant is entitled to an award of fees and expenses if they can 
meet same the three-prong criteria for such an award in civil cases. 
The three criteria for an award of fees pursuant to the P.A.G.D. are 1) the strength or 
societal importance of the public policy indicated by the litigation; 2) the necessity for private 
enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the Plaintiff; and 3) the number of 
people standing to benefit from the decision. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 
(1984); Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). Davidson believes he has 
met all three criteria; the state argues he has met none. 
With respect to the first criteria, this case addresses both procedural and substantive due 
process challenges to a driver's license suspension scheme. An individual's right to their license 
has been described as "very important" by the U.S. Supreme Court: "Once licenses are issued. .. 
their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood." Bell v. Burson, 
supra. With respect to the second criteria, the state of Idaho proved that private enforcement of 
these due process rights was necessary, as they did not acquiesce to Davidson's arguments in 
their reply brief. The magnitude of the burden on Davidson in carrying this appeal forward has 
been substantial. Clearly, it would be a burden for any attorney to carry a case from the 
magistrate court to the Supreme Court of Idaho. The burden is greatly magnified for a pro se 
litigant to do the same thing. This case is about to reach its four year anniversary. Davidson was 
arrested for DWP on November 29, 2007. For all intents and purposes, Davidson is "poor." He 
does not have any personal wealth nor does he live in comfort. Therefore, the many, many hours 
he has spent dealing with this case constitute a lost "opportunity cost" that will likely never be 
recovered. With respect to the third criteria, there are a large number of citizens who stand to 
benefit from a favorable decision in Davison's case. Every Idaho resident who possesses a 
driver's license will have increased due process protections. As stated previously, in 2005 nearly 
65,000 Idahoans had their driver's license suspended, and nearly 19,000 of those were related to 
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a failure to pay an infraction penalty. Davidson has clearly met all three criteria of the P.A.G.D. 
If the court finds that Davidson has met the criteria, the next step is to resolve the conflict 
that pro se litigants, in general, are not entitled to an award of attorney fees, because the term 
"attorney fee" denotes an attorney I client relationship. This can be overcome without 
overturning any existing caselaw. Under the P.A.G.D., a de facto attorney/ client relationship is 
created between the litigant and the public. The litigant assumes the role of "The Private 
Attorney General," representing the people of the state at large; fighting for their constitutional 
rights. Because of the substantial benefit received by the public, they are expected to "pay their 
attorney." In this case, Davidson is serving as the private attorney general; his clients are the 
people of Idaho. 
If the court does not want to go so far as to give an award of "attorney fees" to Davidson, 
it could still grant him "reasonable expenses" pursuant to the P.A.G.D .. In the context of a pro 
se litigant, reasonable expenses could include the cost of his time, or the lost opportunity costs. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has never held that "reasonable expenses" cannot include 
compensation for a pro se litigant's time in preparing their case. 
Therefore, Davidson should be awarded his reasonable expenses if he prevails on any 
constitutional issue in front of the Supreme Court, in an amount to be determined by the court at 
a later time. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has made a compelling case that a majority of the driver's license 
suspension statute, Idaho Code § 49-1505, is unconstitutional. Davidson has also demonstrated 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, that the magistrate court abused its discretion 
when it immediately remanded Davidson into custody after sentencing, and that Davidson is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. Davidson's conviction of Driving Without Privileges 
cannot be upheld. The Appellant hereby requests that this Court reverse the decisions of the 
District Court and the Magistrate Court. 
Dated this 14th day of November, 201Jr 
Rfcm1)avidson, Pro Se 
/On behalf of Himself 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ryan Davidson, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the "Appellant's Reply 
Brief' was sent to the following individuals by hand delivery: 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Dated this 14th day of November, 201J--· 
.. / 
/RyariDa~idson, Pro Se 
O;rbehalf of Himself 
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EXHIBITS 
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I EXHIBIT 'A' I 
http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/stuck-in-the-system/Content?oid=925491 
lanuary 04, 2006 
Stuck in the System 
How Idaho's traffic laws lead to ruin for the poor 
by Will Schmeckpeper 
If you're like one of over 68,000 Idahoans, in 2005 you found yourself with a suspended drivers 
license. Maybe it was revoked for driving under the influence (5,971 suspensions), or perhaps the ex 
is tired of waiting for a child support payment (2,259 suspensions), but whatever the reason (refusal 
to submit to Breathalyzer testing? 1,640 suspensions), you found yourself in a sticky situation--and 
if you're poor, living paycheck-to-paycheck, the more you struggle, the worse it seems to get. 
Ada County deputy public defenders Ann Cosho and David J. Smethers estimate that 90 percent of 
the repeat offenders they represent come from "a lower economic class." And they say that once in 
the system, many of these people experience a snowball effect. Smethers outlines the common 
scenario like this : Average Joe gets pulled over for an equipment problem (e .g. a faulty taillight), and 
he gets cited. Joe then forgets to pay his fine--hey, he's got two jobs and a kid at home with the flu-
-and the ticket goes through the system as unpaid, at which point the Idaho Department of 
Transportation is informed and they suspend Joe's driving privileges, just like they did to over 
19,000 Idaho drivers this year. (Failure to pay a fine is the most common reason for license 
suspensions in Idaho.) 
But it gets worse for Joe. Let's say he's moved in the past six months--maybe he's been sleeping in 
his truck, maybe shacking up at a friend's house. The news that his license has been suspended 
doesn't ever find Joe, he thinks everything's all right, and then he gets pulled over for that pesky 
taillight he still can't afford to get fixed. Only now, Joe is cited for DWP (driving without privileges) 
and--like over 5,000 Idaho drivers in 2005--gets his license further suspended. Now he's facing 
llPa ge 
reinstatement fees and citation fines--and, remember, Joe couldn't afford any of this in the first 
place. One more DWP, and Joe faces a mandatory 20 days in jail (1 0 days more than the mandatory 
minimum jail time for a second DUl)--all from a broken taillight and a little bit of laziness. 
Or, in another scenario, let's say Joe's still living paycheck-to-paycheck, but instead of having a 
broken taillight, he forgets to send in his insurance payment one month. Last year, over 14,000 
Idaho drivers had their licenses suspended due to lack of proof of insurance, along with another 
8,500 failed to maintain their insurance and over 1,400 who had no liability insurance whatsoever. 
Joe would've been better off with the shot taillight, because now he's invoked the wrath of the SR-22, 
a state-requested "red-flag" that informs the Department of Transportation if Joe's insurance has 
lapsed, which--if Joe doesn't promptly reinstate his insurance--then results in the revoking of his 
license. 
Unfortunately for Joe, however, the SR-22 also serves as a warning to insurance companies. 
According to Bob Henry of Henry Insurance Agency of Nampa, Joe now has to seek out "specialty" 
insurance, because most "preferred" companies won't issue an SR-22. "It also wouldn't be 
unreasonable to expect a 50 percent increase in premiums," adds Henry. 
Joe now has a choice to make, according to Boise criminal attorney Thomas McCabe: "Find the 
money, stop driving and move closer to work, or break the law." McCabe says the damaging effects 
of an SR-22 are like getting stuck in a tar-pit: "The more you fight, the more you get stuck." McCabe 
also says that people can expect to forfeit, "their right arm and left leg and first born" if they face an 
SR-22. 
Joe likes his right arm. So maybe he's smart enough to get a public defender to keep this nasty stuff 
from happening. After all, he can't afford a private attorney. But is that enough? 
"I suspect--nothing against quality--1 suspect they [public defenders] are over-worked to where 
they cannot devote sufficient time to their cases," says Jack Van Valkenburgh of ACLU Idaho. 
McCabe adds, "The more prep time, the better the chances for a good result. It's a practical matter. 
As a private attorney, I can limit my case load. With a public defender, with their case load, the sky's 
the limit." 
So let's stand Joe up, dust him off and take a look at him. He's broke, there's little chance of him 
moving closer to work (check the cost of property here lately?) and he's faced with the choice of 
breaking the law or ... you know, destitution. Starvation. Stuff like that. Of course, he could always 
ride the bus. 
"I see a lot of repeat offenders because of this situation. In a town like Boise where you have to drive, 
transportation is a huge issue for my clients," says Cosho. But there's a problem: The bus system in 
Boise is limited at best, and woefully inadequate the rest of the time. McCabe rates it a 2 out of 10, 
and says he deosn't plan on seeing it get any better any time soon. 
ZIP 
"[Society's] not interested in public transportation except for economic or legal reasons," he says. 
"We're enslaved to the individuality of a car." 
This situation hasn't gone unnoticed by state legislators. "We need to have public transportation 
alternatives, particularly for low-income, restricted, and the handicapped," says District 19 
Representative Michael Burkett (D-Boise). "Our bus system needs to be expanded and enhanced." 
Still, Joe could make do with what the bus offers--provided he didn't have to be anywhere after 7:40 
p.m. (when ValleyRide shuts down for the night), further limiting the type of job and hours he is able 
to work. How ya' feeling, Joe? Don't you wish you'd stopped at that railroad crossing (another of over 
60 different reasons why nearly 5 percent of Idaho drivers have had their licenses suspended)? 
"People make economic and survival choices all the time," says McCabe. ''The problem is, when you 
have laws like this, you create a larger and larger outlaw mentality. We need to eliminate the criminal 
and outlaw mentality, but we're doing things that are counterproductive." 
Smethers and Cos ho concur, saying that the repeat offenders whom they serve quickly develop a 
"mindset of 'them against the government."' 
What would be productive, says Burkett, is to rethink our mandatory minimum sentences. 'What we 
need is to leave this to the discretion of the judges," he says. "This is the type of crime that cries out 
for traditional discretion." One avenue for exploring alternatives to the affect of the DWP downward 
spiral is the use of community service, rather than fees, for traffic violations. "Community service is a 
real, valid way to approach criminal sanctioning that works in many situations," says Burkett. "But 
we're not utilizing it as much as we used to. I'd like to see it used more." 
Until the Idaho Legislature chooses to rethink their stance on driving laws and how they affect our 
ever-growing lower economic class, the city of Boise considers overhauling its public transportation 
system, or public defenders are allowed the time and resources to present more thorough 
representation for their clients, everyone interviewed agrees, the ''.Joes" of our society are likely to be 
stuck where the economically downtrodden have always been stuck: fighting the system ... and 
losing. 
htt : ''www.boiseweekl .com boise/stuck-in-the-s stem Content?oid=925491 
3IPac;::, C ,..~ 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
EXHIBIT 'B' 
RS 8745 
Idaho has recently enacted a Traffic Infractions Act 
with the stated purpose to reduce con-Jestion in the court 
system, to improve the ability of peace officers to regulate 
and control motor vehicle traffic, and to achieve slcnificant 
econo.nies in ·the administr.Jtion of justice. T"is act has 
made :ill minor tr.:tCfic viol.:il ions 11oncrinii11;1l in nature, and 
no per:.~>n m.,y be arrc:;tci.l or j:iilc,1 for .:tn inh'.:icti.on vioL:ation. 
llnwev-=r, .nn incun:;i::.tcncy still exists uml.:r the l.:iw in that · -L 
a person in;iy not be incarcerated for a traffic infraction, ---'.-~•}:": 
but that nonpayment of a traff i c infraction -.iy result in a .·,· .·. · 
driver' a being held in co:atetlpt of cou=t and jailed until ~ · 
payment :h made. A better method of enforcement of nonpayment 
, of infraction penalties is needed other than jailing .people · 
. for nonpayment of a civil penalty. .· · 
Thia bill would make a m.11.lber of technical cot'rectiona 
in the code needed to correct references to the Traffic 
Infractions Act and clarify procedures to be followed in 
implementinf the new law. Additionally, the bill sets ap a 
new method or enforcing nonpay:ient of traffic infraction 
penaltiesJ by providing that J driver's licen~e 111ay be 
suspended for nonpayment. This me·chod of enforce~nt through 
the licensing process is aiore consisten t with regulating the 
privilege of driving on state's highways, anJ also avoids 
_invoking criminal-type trea::.mc::.t and incarceration of drivers 
for a civil violation of the state's laws. ~: . 
Thi• bill would also prohibit the arrest of a person 
for refusing to sign a uniform citation, thus avoiding &1ny 
~cedless altercations bet~~en citizens and police officers. 
The bill provides that a citation aay be served upon the 
defendant by an officer us an .,1lternative to ola:iining a 
si~naLure on the citation. 
Another change in the bill, is to deal with the problca 
of nonpayment 0£ traffic infraction penaltie:a by ainoi·s, who 
mf.ght be insolvent. by providing that a person who signs the 
application by a minor for a driver's permit or license 
shall be liable for the pay,nent of any infraction penalty 
assessed by the courts. Thia theory of 11.:ibility is consistent: 
V'i th the existing Uabili ty of a parent or guardian for · 
da.mage _caused by a minor operating a motor vehicle. 
To offs.et any increased cost to the Dc-part:ment of 
Transportation's Division of Motor Vehicles in suspending 
licenses for nonpayml!nt of infraction pcnaltic?~, this bill 
wou_ld re:.,;Jire payment of a Ciflcrn dollar ($15.90) fee tQ 
r~instatc a revoke.cl or _sui.pcndrd drivc,r' s licens e. ·.s· . 
FISCAL NOTE 
.. • ... · .,. 
· The only fiscal impact on th~ state gl!neral account of 
,• : ~- ·-~ . 
. this bill is a possible increase in orcrating costs to the . 
Department of Transportation by reas on of additional personnel 
and operating expenses incurred by the Division of Motor 
Vehicleti in suspending ond reinstatin& driver's licenses for 
nonpaym.ent of infraction penalties. No additi.onal hearing 
responsibilities would be placed on the dep~rtoent, as 
•us.pension• would be automatic by court order 11nd appeals 
would be to the district court. This bill provides for a 
license reinstatement fee oi fifteen dollars (~15.00) to 
offset any increased cosi:s in~urred by the department. 
By establishing a new method for enforce .enc of nonp.1~nt 
of traffic penal ties through the license suspension p·rocess, 
this bill would result in s.:ivings to local gnvern.ments by 
making unnecessary the current expensei: 0£ issuin& and 
serving arrest warrants and pro"ecutins d'efc11dcnts for 
ncmpayr:ient of traf!ic fines. 
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